

1 **Q. ENERGY SUPPLY**

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3 **PUB 31.0 (RE: B-12, Wesleyville Gas Turbine Overhaul)**

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5 **PUB 31.1**

6 **Explain why the conclusions of Rolls-Royce (Volume II, Energy Supply, Appendix**
7 **2, Attachment A, p. 2) were not followed.**

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9 **“The gas generator was inspected prior to the move and the**
10 **recommendation at that time was to have the unit sent to an approved**
11 **overhaul facility for repair prior to running the unit.”**

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13 **A.** The recommendations of both Rolls-Royce reports are being followed, but at a more
14 appropriate time.

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16 Relevant to the relocation of the Salt Pond gas turbine, there have been three inspections
17 of the gas turbine: the Trans Canada Turbine inspection in 2000; the first Rolls Royce
18 inspection in 2003 prior to moving the gas turbine from Salt Pond; and the second Rolls
19 Royce inspection after the gas turbine was relocated to Wesleyville. The Trans Canada
20 Turbine inspection carried out prior to the initial planning of the relocation project was
21 largely positive. Both Rolls Royce inspections in 2003 recommended an overhaul of the
22 gas generator (engine).

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24 At the time of the first Rolls Royce inspection, in March 2003, Newfoundland Power was
25 in the midst of this large relocation project, which had already been delayed as a result of
26 reliability problems on the Burin Peninsula in 2002. A further delay would significantly
27 impact an ongoing project, with specifications and tendering processes having to be
28 changed, likely resulting in increased costs and a much later completion of the relocation.
29 Further, a better approach to the overhaul would likely result if it could be done on a
30 planned basis, including preparation of a proper specification and obtaining competitive
31 bids.

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33 Another aspect that influenced the Company’s decisions at the time of the 2003 Rolls
34 Royce inspection was the nature of Newfoundland Power’s use of the gas turbine.
35 Unlike many of the gas generators serviced by Rolls Royce, the Wesleyville gas
36 generator is not a continuous service unit. It was to be operated infrequently in response
37 to outages and system requirements. In Newfoundland Power’s judgment, the risk to the
38 unit associated with using the gas turbine on that basis until proper arrangements could
39 be made for a scheduled overhaul was acceptable.