IN THE MATTER OF the *Public Utilities Act*, (the "Act"); and

IN THE MATTER OF the establishment of a just and reasonable return on rate base pursuant to Section 80 of the Act for Newfoundland Power Inc. ("Newfoundland Power").

Requests for Information by the Consumer Advocate

CA-NP-201 to CA-NP-310

April 16, 2012

| 1 | CA-NP-201 | Company Evidence, p. 1: What formula does the Régie employ to establish |
|----|-----------|--|
| 2 | | returns for Gáz Metro? |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | CA-NP-202 | Company Evidence, p. 1: Further to the previous question, when was this |
| 5 | | formula by the Régie established and in what proceeding? Please provide a |
| 6 | | copy of the decision/order. |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | CA-NP-203 | Company Evidence, p. 1: What formula does the Ontario Energy Board employ |
| 9 | | to establish returns for electricity distributors under its jurisdiction? |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | CA-NP-204 | Company Evidence, p. 1: When was the formula as is in use today established |
| 12 | | by the OEB and in what proceeding? Please provide a copy of the |
| 13 | | decision/order. |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | CA-NP-205 | Company Evidence, p. 1: The Company, in referring to the use of formulas, |
| 16 | | states in footnote 2 on p. 1 that the "BCUC may consider the matter in cost of |
| 17 | | capital proceedings in 2012." What is the basis for this statement and what is |
| 18 | | the status of the cost of capital proceedings referred to? |
| 19 | | |

| 1 | CA-NP-206 | Company Evidence, p. 1: The Company states in footnote 2 that in late 2011, |
|----|-----------|--|
| 2 | | "the AUC decided not to reinstate a formula but has left the matter open for |
| 3 | | reconsideration for 2013 (see Decision 2011 – 474, December 8, 2011)". |
| 4 | | Please provide a copy of the referred decision and page references for these two |
| 5 | | statements. |
| 6 | | |
| 7 | CA-NP-207 | Company Evidence, p. 3: At p. 3 the Company states, "Operation of the |
| 8 | | Formula for 2011 resulted in an estimated return on equity for Newfoundland |
| 9 | | Power of 8.38% ⁴ . This was the lowest ratemaking return on equity for a |
| 10 | | Canadian investor owned electric utility for 2011 ⁵ ." Please confirm that NP's |
| 11 | | stated return for 2011 was just and reasonable and met the fair return standard in |
| 12 | | all respects. |
| 13 | | |
| 14 | CA-NP-208 | Company Evidence, p. 3: What were the allowed ratios for equity (versus debt) |
| 15 | | in each of the Canadian investor-owned electric utilities to which reference is |
| 16 | | made in footnote 5 of p. 3. |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | CA-NP-209 | Company Evidence, p. 3: At p. 3, footnote 6, the Company states, "For 2012, |
| 19 | | ratemaking returns on equity for Canadian investor-owned electric utilities, other |
| 20 | | than Newfoundland Power, range from a low of 8.75% in Alberta to a high of |
| 21 | | 9.9% in British Columbia." Please indicate which Alberta utilities are allowed an |
| 22 | | 8.75% return on equity in 2012 and provide a copy of the decision extract or |
| 23 | | order prescribing that allowed rate of return. |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | CA-NP-210 | Company Evidence, p. 3, footnote 6: Please provide a copy of BCUC Order No. |
| 26 | | G-20-012 which establishes a proceeding to determine the appropriate cost of |
| 27 | | capital for a benchmark low risk utility effective January 1, 2013. |
| 28 | | |
| 29 | CA-NP-211 | Company Evidence, p. 16, footnote 56: Which BC and Alberta utilities have |
| 30 | | recovery mechanisms for employee future benefit costs? Which other Canadian |
| 31 | | utilities have equivalents to Newfoundland Power's PEVDA and OPEBVA? |
| 32 | | |
| 33 | CA-NP-212 | Please confirm that Newfoundland Power's various regulatory mechanisms such |
| 34 | | as the PEVDA, WNR, etc. transfer the risk of costs, whether positive or negative, |

| 1 | | to ratepayers? |
|----|-----------|---|
| 2 | | |
| 3 | CA-NP-213 | Company Evidence, p. 18: The Company states that, "The Company's target of |
| 4 | | 45% common equity units Capital Structure is consistent with Board Orders since |
| 5 | | 1990 ⁶² . Newfoundland Power's capital structure is a relative strength that |
| 6 | | mitigates risks associated with the Company's small size and low long-term |
| 7 | | forecast growth estimates ⁶³ ." What was Newfoundland Power's common |
| 8 | | equity proportion prior to P.U. 1 (1990). Please demonstrate and explain how |
| 9 | | ratepayers benefit from the present 45% proportion of equity in the Company's |
| 10 | | capital structure relative to a 40% equity component, given that the cost of debt is |
| 11 | | less than the cost of equity. |
| 12 | | |
| 13 | CA-NP-214 | Company Evidence, p. 25: The Company states, "A reasonable opportunity to |
| 14 | | recover the rate of return requires consideration of the timing of Newfoundland |
| 15 | | Power's next general rate application." When does Newfoundland Power intend |
| 16 | | to file its next GRA and what are the considerations that Newfoundland Power |
| 17 | | has in terms of timing for its next GRA? |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | CA-NP-215 | Company Evidence, p. 28: The Company states, "Continued use of the 2012 |
| 20 | | ratemaking return on equity for 2013 would be reasonable and consistent with |
| 21 | | current consistent public utility practice." In its application, Newfoundland Power |
| 22 | | does not seek, request or apply for continued use of the 2012 ratemaking return |
| 23 | | on equity for 2013. Please clarify the Company's request in relation to 2013 in |
| 24 | | this proceeding. |
| 25 | | |
| 26 | CA-NP-216 | Please provide a copy of Newfoundland Power's five year financial forecast. |
| 27 | | Please forecast all changes in the revenue requirement and required rate action |
| 28 | | for the next five years. |
| 29 | | |
| 30 | CA-NP-217 | Please provide a copy of Newfoundland Power's Quarterly Annual Reports from |
| 31 | | 2008 to present as filed with the Board. |
| 32 | | |
| 33 | CA-NP-218 | Please provide a copy of the Annual Reports of Fortis Inc. from 2008 to present. |
| 34 | | |

| 1 | CA-NP-219 | Who will be testifying on behalf of Newfoundland Power at the hearing of this |
|----------|-------------|---|
| 2 | | application, and if witnesses will be testifying, other than Ms. McShane and Dr. |
| 3 | | Vander Weide, please provide an overview of their anticipated evidence. |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | CA-NP-220 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 6 | · | Utility Sample.": Please explain the weighting scheme used by Ms. McShane in |
| 7 | | arriving at her ROE recommendation for Newfoundland Power using her tests. |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | CA-NP-221 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 10 | | Utility Sample.": At Appendix "B", Ms. McShane states that the sample is |
| 11 | | comprised of all U.S. electric and natural gas utilities. Please confirm that the |
| 12 | | companies chosen are not utilities themselves but are holding companies that |
| 13 | | own both utility companies and non-regulated businesses. |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | CA-NP-222 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane – Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 16 | | Utility Sample.": In Ms. McShane's U.S. Utility Sample, she provides |
| 17 | | "Utility-specific information in respect of each of the companies from pages B-2 to |
| 18 | | B-34 of Appendix "B". Please state the source(s) of this data reported in respect |
| 19 | | of each of the U.S. corporations listed at p. B-1. |
| 20 | | Fuidance of Kathleen McChana - Annandiu (D) (Calastina et II C. I. au Diala |
| 21 | CA-NP-223 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane – Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 22 | | Utility Sample.": Please provide a copy of the latest annual report for each of |
| 23 24 | | the U.S. companies that populate Ms. McShane's "U.S. Low Risk Utility Sample". |
| 25 | CA-NP-224 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane – Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 26 | OA-IVI -224 | Utility Sample.": With respect to Ms. McShane's "U.S. Low Risk Utility Sample", |
| 27 | | please indicate which of the companies that populate her 13-firm U.S. company |
| 28 | | sample were also used to populate the U.S. Low Risk Utility Sample which she |
| 29 | | employed when she last presented evidence before the Board on behalf of |
| 30 | | Newfoundland Power Inc. for Newfoundland Power's 2010 GRA? |
| 31 | | . 15 |
| 32 | CA-NP-225 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane – Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low risk Utility |
| 33 | | Sample.": Does Ms. McShane consider her present U.S. Low Risk Utility |
| 34 | | Sample on an overall basis to have "less risk, "more risk" or "equal risk" as her |
| | | |

| 1 | | U.S. sample of companies in her 2009 Evidence before the Board in support of |
|----|-----------|---|
| 2 | | Newfoundland Power's GRA? Please explain the basis for the answer. |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | CA-NP-226 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane – Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 5 | | Utility Sample.": Please provide a list of U.S. companies used by Ms. McShane |
| 6 | | in her NP 2010 GRA Evidence as well as a listing of the U.S. companies used in |
| 7 | | her present U.S. Low Risk Utility Sample filed in her evidence on this application. |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | CA-NP-227 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane – Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 10 | | Utility Sample.": Please list any companies which Ms. McShane has eliminated |
| 11 | | from her U.S. Low Risk Utility Sample as in her 2010 NP GRA Evidence in |
| 12 | | constructing the sample used in support of her present evidence and application |
| 13 | | and explain Ms. McShane's reasons for no longer including the same in the |
| 14 | | present sample for the purposes of this proceeding. |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | CA-NP-228 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 17 | | Utility Sample.": Has Ms. McShane presented evidence such as found at pp. |
| 18 | | B-2 to B-34 of "Appendix B – Selection of U.S. Low Risk Utility Sample: to other |
| 19 | | regulatory boards. If so, state when and to what board and on behalf of what |
| 20 | | client? |
| 21 | | |
| 22 | CA-NP-229 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 23 | | Utility Sample.": For each of the U.S. companies in Ms. McShane's Low Risk |
| 24 | | Utility Sample" she refers to "RRA Regulatory Climate", which she further |
| 25 | | describes at p. B-34. Please confirm that RRA is Regulatory Research |
| 26 | | Associates based out of Charlottesville, Virginia, U.S.A. Please also provide a |
| 27 | | copy of RRA's complete methodology and rating system for utility regulatory |
| 28 | | climates. |
| 29 | | |
| 30 | CA-NP-230 | Please provide a copy of RRA's rating for each utility regulatory regime in the |
| 31 | | United States. |
| 32 | | |
| 33 | CA-NP-231 | Please provide a copy of RRA's rating for each utility regulatory regime in |
| 34 | | Canada. |

| 1 | | |
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| 2 | CA-NP-232 | Please provide a copy of Moody's Rating Methodology for March 2005 entitled, |
| 3 | | "Rating Methodology: Global Regulated Electric Utilities". |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | CA-NP-233 | Please provide a copy of Moody's August 2009 Rating Methodology for |
| 6 | | "Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities". |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | CA-NP-234 | Please provide a copy of Moody's most recent rating methodology for Regulated |
| 9 | | Electric and Gas Utilities. |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | CA-NP-235 | For each of Ms. McShane's U.S. companies in her "U.S. Low Risk Utility Sample" |
| 12 | | she provides a block called "Moody's Rating Methodology" and Ms. McShane |
| 13 | | then reports the ratings for the following categories: Regulatory framework, |
| 14 | | Ability to Recover Costs/Earn Return, Diversification and Financial Strength. |
| 15 | | For each of the U.S. companies in Ms. McShane's U.S. Low Risk Utility Sample, |
| 16 | | please provide a copy of the Moody's source document containing the ratings |
| 17 | | reported by Ms. McShane in respect of each of the U.S. companies in her |
| 18 | | sample. |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | CA-NP-236 | For each of Ms. McShane's U.S. companies in her "U.S. Low Risk Utility Sample" |
| 21 | | she provides a block called S&P's Regulatory Comment and then Ms. McShane |
| 22 | | reports a quotation in the adjacent box from S&P. For each of the U.S. |
| 23 | | companies in Ms. McShane's U.S. Low Risk Utility Sample please provide a copy |
| 24 | | of the S&P report from which Ms. McShane quotes in her chart. |
| 25 | | |
| 26 | CA-NP-237 | In Newfoundland Power's last GRA – Moody's Credit Opinion, August 3, 2009 |
| 27 | | (see Application 1st Revision, Exhibit 4) acknowledges the differences the |
| 28 | | regulatory and business environments in the U.S. and Canada, stating: |
| 29 | | |
| 30 | | "NPI's Baaa 1 issues rating reflects the fact that the company's |
| 31 | | operations are exclusively based in Canada, a jurisdiction where |
| 32 33 | | regulatory and business environments in general are relatively more supportive than those of other international jurisdictions such as the |
| 34 | | United States, in Moody's view." |
| 35 | | |

| 1 | | In Ms. McShane's view, was Moody's wrong when it made this statement |
|----------|-----------|--|
| 2 | | pertaining to the regulatory and business environments in Canada and the U.S.? |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | CA-NP-238 | With reference to the previous question, is Ms. McShane aware of any |
| 5 | | statements from Moody's since August 3, 2009 in which Moody's states that it no |
| 6 | | longer thinks that Canada's regulatory and business environments in general are |
| 7 | | relatively more supportive than those of the United States? |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | CA-NP-239 | In its Credit Opinion of 19 July 2011 on Newfoundland Power Inc., Moody's |
| 10 | | states, |
| 11 | | , |
| 12 | | "All of NPI's operations are located in Canada whose regulatory and |
| 13 | | business environments we consider to be supportive relative to those in |
| 14 | | other jurisdictions. Further, we consider the PUB to be one of the more |
| 15 | | supportive regulators in Canada. Notwithstanding that NPI's 2011 |
| 16 17 | | allowed ROE of 8.38% is currently one of the lowest in Canada, its 45% deemed equity is one of the highest in Canada and the PUB's decisions |
| 18 | | tend to be timely and balanced. We believe that the PUB's review and |
| 19 | | approval of NPI's capital spending plans and long term debt issuances |
| 20 | | significantly reduces the risk of cost allowances or the inability to fully |
| 21 | | recover costs on a timely basis. NPI submits a proposed capital plan for |
| 22 23 | | PUB approval annually. Furthermore, NPI is required to obtain PUB pre-approval for the issuance of any First Mortgage Bonds (FMB) or the |
| 24 | | incurrence of credit facilities with maturities exceeding one year." |
| 25 | | , and the second control of the second contr |
| 26 | | Does Ms. McShane know why Moody's considers Canada's regulatory and |
| 27 | | business environments to be supportive relative to those in other jurisdictions, |
| 28 | | which the Consumer Advocate takes to include the U.S.? Does Ms. McShane |
| 29 | | agree with Moody's opinion? If not, why not? |
| 30 | | |
| 31 | CA-NP-240 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 32 | | Utility Sample.": Out of her U.S. Low Risk sample, please indicate for which |
| 33 | | U.S. utility companies (and indicate the parent name) Ms. McShane has provided |
| 34 | | expert evidence for in cost of capital matters since 2000. (Please state date of |
| 35 | | testimony). |
| 36 | | |
| 37 | CA-NP-241 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane – Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |

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| 1 | | Othity Sample. For each of the 0.5. utility holding companies in ivis. |
|----|-----------|--|
| 2 | | McShane's sample, Ms. McShane lists the holding company's regulated |
| 3 | | subsidiaries, eg. AGL Resources - Nicor Gas, Atlanta Gas Light, etc. When |
| 4 | | these regulated subsidiaries file rate cases in their respective U.S. jurisdictions, |
| 5 | • | do they file credit opinions from rating agencies such as Moody's and/or |
| 6 | | S&P, as Newfoundland Power does in this jurisdiction? |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | CA-NP-242 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 9 | | Utility Sample.": Please provide a copy of the latest credit opinions from |
| 0 | | Moody's and S&P for each of the regulated subsidiaries of the 13 U.S. |
| 11 | | companies that populate the "U.S. Low Risk Utility Sample". Should the latest |
| 12 | | credit opinion not be available, please file the credit opinion last filed with the |
| 13 | | respective regulator. |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | CA-NP-243 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 16 | | Utility Sample.": Please provide a copy of the latest credit opinions from |
| 17 | | Moody's and S&P for each of the 13 U.S. companies that populate the "U.S. Low |
| 18 | | Risk Utility Sample". |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | CA-NP-244 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 21 | | Utility Sample.": For each of Ms. McShane's U.S. companies in her "U.S. Low |
| 22 | | Risk Utility Sample" she provides a block called "Percentage of Assets in Utility |
| 23 | | Operations". Ms. McShane also states at p. B-1 that her U.S. sample |
| 24 | | companies have "Utility assets equal to or greater than 80% of total assets". |
| 25 | | Please explain the reasons why the proportion of non-regulated business was a |
| 26 | | factor for Ms. McShane in constructing her sample. |
| 27 | | |
| 28 | CA-NP-245 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 29 | | Utility Sample.": Please clarify whether the term "Percentage of Assets in Utility |
| 30 | | Operations" used by Ms. McShane means the percentage of assets in regulated |
| 31 | | utility operations. |
| 32 | | |
| 33 | CA-NP-246 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 34 | | Utility Sample.": For each of Ms. McShane's U.S. companies in her "U.S. Low |
| | | |

| 1 | | Risk Utility Sample", Ms. McShane provides "Customers by Type". Please |
|----------|-----------|--|
| 2 | | explain how the "Customers by Type" is relevant to the comparison for the |
| 3 | | purposes of this application of the companies in her sample to Newfoundland |
| 4 | | Power Inc. |
| 5 | | |
| 6 | CA-NP-247 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane – Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 7 | | Utility Sample.": Moody's credit opinion of 19 July 2011 on Newfoundland |
| 8 | | Power states: |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | | "NP's own generation assets are regulated and represent roughly 15% of |
| 11 12 | | NPI's property, plant and equipment. Accordingly, Moody's considers NPI's business risk profile to be more like that of a T&D utility than a |
| 13 | | vertically integrated utility. The T&D segment is regarded as a relatively |
| 14 | | lower risk segment of the electric utility industry since it is typically not |
| 15 | | exposed to commodity price and volume risks or the operational, |
| 16 | | financial, and environmental risks associated with electricity generation." |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | | Which of the U.S. companies in Ms. McShane's 13 company U.S. Low Risk |
| 19 | | Utility Sample are a Transmission and Distribution utility like NP? |
| 20 | | |
| 21 | CA-NP-248 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane – Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 22 | | Utility Sample.": Please confirm that Ms. McShane, in constructing her sample, |
| 23 | | makes no distinction between small, mid-cap and large-cap companies. |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | CA-NP-249 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane – Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 26 | | Utility Sample.": Which of Ms. McShane's companies would be considered by |
| 27 | | Ms. McShane to be small, mid-cap and large-cap? |
| 28 | | |
| 29 | CA-NP-250 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane – Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 30 | | Utility Sample.": Would Ms. McShane please identify which of the companies in |
| 31 | | her Low Risk Utility Sample would be considered by her to be, |
| 32 | | (a) less risky than Newfoundland Power? |
| 33 | | (b) more risky than Newfoundland Power? |
| 34 | | (c) equally risky as Newfoundland Power? |
| 35 | | |
| 36 | CA-NP-251 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| | | |

| 1 | | Utility Sample.": Further to the previous question, please provide reasons why |
|----|-----------|---|
| 2 | | Ms. McShane classifies the particular U.S. companies as being "less risky than |
| 3 | | NP", "equally as risky" and "more risky" as the case may be. |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | CA-NP-252 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B", "Selection of U.S. Low Risk |
| 6 | | Utility Sample.": Can Ms. McShane cite any instances in the U.S. where a utility |
| 7 | | has applied for and been granted a determination of its cost of equity (without the |
| 8 | | necessity of filing a general rate application) in the manner proposed by |
| 9 | | Newfoundland Power in this instance? |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | CA-NP-253 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B": Ms. McShane refers to |
| 12 | | "Percentage of Assets in Utility Operations." On the measure of "Percentage of |
| 13 | | Assets in Utility Operations", please confirm that Newfoundland Power (which |
| 14 | | has 100% of its assets in regulated utility operations) is less risky than each of |
| 15 | | the U.S. companies in her sample. If Ms. McShane cannot confirm this, please |
| 16 | | explain why not. |
| 17 | | |
| 18 | CA-NP-254 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B": Ms. McShane refers to |
| 19 | | "Customers by Type". DBRS's Rating Report of January 24, 2012 notes that |
| 20 | | "Newfoundland Power has a stable customer base, with power sales comprised |
| 21 | | solely of residential and commercial customers. Serving industrial customers |
| 22 | | exposes organizations to a greater level of counterparty risk and increased |
| 23 | | earnings volatility." Does Ms. McShane agree with DBRS' assessment? |
| 24 | | |
| 25 | CA-NP-255 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B": On the measure of "Customers |
| 26 | | by Type", please confirm that Newfoundland Power (which has a stable customer |
| 27 | | base with power sales comprised solely of residential and commercial |
| 28 | | customers) is less risky than each of the U.S. companies in Ms. McShane's |
| 29 | | sample. If Ms. McShane cannot confirm this, please explain why not. |
| 30 | | |
| 31 | CA-NP-256 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B": Ms. McShane refers to "Test |
| 32 | | Year" in her descriptions of her U.S. companies. One notes that her companies' |
| 33 | | subsidiaries are variously subject to "Partially Forecast", "Forecast", "Historic", |
| 34 | | and "Historic (adj. for known and measurable changes)". Please explain the |
| | | |

| 1 | | difference between each type of test year. Please also indicate which type, if |
|----|-----------|--|
| 2 | | any, is "least risky" to the utility and which is "most risky" to the utility. |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | CA-NP-257 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B": For each of her U.S. |
| 5 | | companies, Ms. McShane refers to "Earnings Sharing." For instance, in the |
| 6 | | case of AGL Resources, Ms. McShane reports at p. B-3 that in Virginia - Virginia |
| 7 | | Natural Gas (which was apparently allowed a 10% Return on Equity for 2011) |
| 8 | | "shares equally with rate payers any gas costs that deviate from |
| 9 | | commission-approved benchmarks." Does this mean that equity investors in |
| 10 | | this firm are at financial risk for gas costs deviations? |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | CA-NP-258 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B": Ms. McShane refers to "Deferral |
| 13 | | Mechanisms" in relation to her U.S. sample of companies. What is an |
| 14 | | "Infrastructure Cost Recovery Mechanism"? (as referenced for example at p. |
| 15 | | B-5 as being applicable to AGL's utilities in GA, NJ) |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | CA-NP-259 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B": Newfoundland Power has the |
| 18 | | Weather Normalization Reserve, Rate Stabilization Account, Demand |
| 19 | | Management Incentive Account, Pension Expense Variance Deferral Account, |
| 20 | | and Other Post-Employments costs deferral account. Please name all |
| 21 | | companies in the U.S. sample of low risk utilities that Ms. McShane considers to |
| 22 | | have more deferral/recovery mechanism protection than Newfoundland Power |
| 23 | | does, less deferral/recovery mechanisms protection than Newfoundland Power |
| 24 | | does and equal deferral/recovery mechanism protection as does Newfoundland |
| 25 | | Power. |
| 26 | | |
| 27 | CA-NP-260 | Up until the last GRA Order, Newfoundland Power did not have a Pension |
| 28 | | Expense Variance Deferral Account (PEVDA). Is the PEVDA a new risk reducer |
| 29 | | for Newfoundland Power? |
| 30 | | |
| 31 | CA-NP-261 | Up until the Board's Order in Order No. P.U. 31 (2010) Newfoundland Power did |
| 32 | | not have the other post-employment benefit variation account (OPEBVA). Is this |
| 33 | | OPEBVA a new risk reducer for Newfoundland Power? |
| 34 | | |

CA-NP-262 Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B": Ms. McShane refers to RRA 1 2 Regulatory Climate. On the measure of Regulatory Climate, please confirm that Newfoundland Power enjoys a regulatory climate in Newfoundland and Labrador 3 that is more supportive than any jurisdiction in the United States. If this cannot 4 be confirmed, please name all states that is/are generally as supportive or more 5 supportive than Newfoundland Power's regulatory climate, in Ms. McShane's 6 7 opinion and provide the basis for this opinion. 8 In Ms. McShane's 2007 evidence before the Board filed in support of CA-NP-263 9 Newfoundland Power's GRA, Ms. McShane stated at p. 9: 10 11 "The regulatory framework in which a utility operates is frequently viewed 12 as the most significant aspect of risk to which investors in the utility are 13 exposed. The financial community is very conscious of the regulatory 14 environment..." 15 16 Is this statement as true today as it was in 2007? 17 18 CA-NP-264 Ms. McShane, in her pre-filed evidence before the Board in 2002 (p. 56 of 67) 19 stated that for her proxy utilities she selected a sample of relatively "pure play" 20 U.S. local gas distribution companies that serve as proxy for Newfoundland 21 22 Power. Ms. McShane explained: 23 24 "Further, I relied on LDCs rather than electric utilities for three reasons. First, Newfoundland Power is primarily an electric distribution utility. 25 There are a very limited number of U.S. electric utilities whose operations 26 are primarily distribution and/or transmission. Second, the operations of 27 electric and gas distribution utilities have significant parallels, and are 28 frequently considered to be proxies for one another. Third, as noted in 29 Section II, a business profile score of "3" which is likely to be assigned to 30 Newfoundland Power is the same as that of the typical U.S. LDC 31 (Schedule 8). In contrast, the typical business score of the U.S. electric 32 utilities is "4" (Schedule 8). 33 34 CA-NP-265 Does Ms. McShane still believe that there are a very limited number of U.S. 35 electric utilities whose operations are primarily distribution and/or transmission? 36 37

| 1 | CA-NP-266 | Further to the previous question, does Ms. McShane still believe that the |
|----|------------|---|
| 2 | | operations of electric and gas distribution utilities have significant parallels? |
| 3 | | |
| 4 | CA-NP-267 | Further to the previous two questions, does Ms. McShane still believe that |
| 5 | | Newfoundland Power would have a different business profile score than the |
| 6 | | typical business score of the U.S. electric utilities? |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | CA-NP-268 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane - Appendix "B": What are the Value Line |
| 9 | | Rankings for each of the U.S. companies in Ms. McShane's sample and what is |
| 10 | | Ms. McShane's opinion as to what the Value Line Ranking would be for |
| 11 | | Newfoundland Power? How would Ms. McShane's opinion on Newfoundland |
| 12 | | Power's cost of capital be influenced if Ms. McShane were to use only U.S. |
| 13 | | companies with the top or highest Value Line rating? |
| 14 | | |
| 15 | CA-NP-269 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane – Appendix "B": Please provide a copy of all |
| 16 | | documents, reports, articles, etc. cited by Ms. McShane in her testimony |
| 17 | | including those listed on p. G-2. |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | CA-NP-270 | Evidence of Kathleen McShane: Please provide an update reply to CA-NP-369 |
| 20 | | from Newfoundland Power's 2010 GRA. |
| 21 | | |
| 22 | CA-NP-271 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Please provide a copy of "Measuring Investors" |
| 23 | | Growth Expectations: Analysts vs. History" noted at p. 89 of 106. |
| 24 | 0 | |
| 25 | CA-NP-272 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Please provide a copy of Principles for Lifetime |
| 26 | | Portfolio Selection: Lessons for Portfolio Theory" noted at p. 89 of 106. |
| 27 | 0 A ND 070 | Ethan (B. Wash Weitle Black and the same (B. Washa Weitleb |
| 28 | CA-NP-273 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Please provide a copy of Dr. Vander Weide's |
| 29 | | testimony for Gulf Power Florida of July 11 (Docket No. 110138-EI) noted at p. |
| 30 | | 90 of 106. |
| 31 | OA NID 074 | Fuidance of Dr. Vandor Waiday Can Dr. Vandor Waida wlassa file a convert his |
| 32 | CA-NP-274 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Can Dr. Vander Weide please file a copy of his |
| 33 | | Curriculum Vitae. |
| 34 | | |

| 1 | CA-NP-275 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: When did Dr. Vander Weide last file evidence |
|----------|-----------|--|
| 2 | | on behalf of a U.S. electricity utility in which he provided an estimate of the firm's |
| 3 | | cost of equity? Please provide a copy of the evidence filed. |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | CA-NP-276 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Please provide extracts from Canadian |
| 6 | | Board/Regulator decisions which commented upon the evidence of Dr. Vander |
| 7 | | Weide (going back to the year 2000). |
| 8 | | |
| 9 | CA-NP-277 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: When was Dr. Vander Weide retained by |
| 10 | | Newfoundland Power pertaining to its Cost of Capital? |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | CA-NP-278 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide, p. 12: Dr. Vander Weide states: |
| 13 | | · |
| 14 | | "Investors are painfully aware that regulators in some jurisdictions have |
| 15 | | been unwilling at times to set rates that allow companies an opportunity to |
| 16 | | recover their cost of service in a timely manner and earn a fair and |
| 17 | | reasonable return on investment. As a result of the perceived increase |
| 18 | | in regulatory risk, investors will demand a higher rate of return for electric |
| 19 20 | | utilities operating in those jurisdictions." |
| 21 | | What jurisdictions/states is Dr. Vander Weide referring to? |
| | | virial jurisdictions/states is Dr. varider violate referring to: |
| 22 | OA ND 070 | Fiddings of D. VerdenWelder at 40. Forther to the consistence whether |
| 23 | CA-NP-279 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide, p. 12: Further to the previous question, what is |
| 24 | | the current allowed return for the electric and gas utilities in these |
| 25 | | jurisdictions/states? Please name the utilities. |
| 26 | | |
| 27 | CA-NP-280 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide, p. 12: What are the 5 least regulatory supportive |
| 28 | | jurisdictions in the U.S. and what are the current allowed returns on equity for its |
| 29 | | utilities, by name? |
| 30 | | |
| 31 | CA-NP-281 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Has Dr. Vander Weide carried out a survey or |
| 32 | | research whereby he has specifically compared all of Newfoundland Power's |
| 33 | | cost recovery mechanisms and risk transfer mechanisms to those available to |
| 34 | | electric utilities in the U.S.? If so, please provide it. |
| 35 | | , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , |
| | | |

| 1 | CA-NP-282 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: What does Dr. Vander Weide know about the |
|----|-----------|---|
| 2 | | quality and level of regulatory support that Newfoundland Power receives in this |
| 3 | | province and what is/are his source(s) of knowledge? |
| 4 | | |
| 5 | CA-NP-283 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: At Newfoundland Power's last GRA, the Board's |
| 6 | | Cost of Capital expert, Mr. Mark Cicchetti of the United States stated that the |
| 7 | | regulatory support in Newfoundland and Labrador is "phenomenal" (Transcript |
| 8 | | October 22, p. 145] and that Newfoundland Power has "exceptional regulation" |
| 9 | | [Transcript October 22, p. 227-8]. Does Dr. Vander Weide agree? |
| 10 | | |
| 11 | CA-NP-284 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: At Newfoundland Power's last GRA, Mr. Mark |
| 12 | | Cicchetti testified that given Newfoundland Power's isolated geographic location |
| 13 | | and customer mix, he had not seen a single utility in his U.S. samples as well |
| 14 | | protected from competition as was Newfoundland Power [Transcript October 22, |
| 15 | | p. 162]. Can Dr. Vander Weide list the U.S. utilities in his sample U.S. |
| 16 | | companies that are as well protected from competition as is Newfoundland |
| 17 | | Power? |
| 18 | | |
| 19 | CA-NP-285 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: At p. 14 of 106, Dr. Vander Weide concludes |
| 20 | | that Newfoundland Power is an "average risk utility". Does that mean that he |
| 21 | | considers Newfoundland Power to be average risk relative to utilities in both |
| 22 | | Canada and the U.S.? |
| 23 | | |
| 24 | CA-NP-286 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Relative to Canada utilities, how would Dr. |
| 25 | | Vander Weide classify Newfoundland Power in terms of risk? |
| 26 | | |
| 27 | CA-NP-287 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Would Dr. Vander Weide confirm that the basis |
| 28 | | for his concluding (at p. 24, line 11-16) that the business risk of electric and |
| 29 | | natural gas utilities are "approximately the same in the U.S. as it is in Canada" |
| 30 | | are the three reasons provided in reply to question 72 at p. 24 of his pre-filed |
| 31 | | evidence. |
| 32 | | |
| 33 | CA-NP-288 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Is the business risk of a U.S. electric utility and |
| 34 | | a U.S. natural gas utility the same? Why or why not? |

| 1 | | |
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| 2 | CA-NP-289 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Ms. McShane's evidence before the Board in |
| 3 | | 2002 was that the typical U.S. LDC would not have the same business profile |
| 4 | | score as a typical U.S. electric utility. (McShane, Evidence of 2002 at p. 56 of |
| 5 | | 67). Does Dr. Vander Weide agree that this is still the case? Please explain |
| 6 | | why it is or is not still the case? |
| 7 | | |
| 8 | CA-NP-290 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Does Dr. Vander Weide dispute that |
| 9 | | Newfoundland Power has lower regulatory risk than the typical U.S. electrical |
| 10 | | utility? |
| 11 | | |
| 12 | CA-NP-291 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Does Dr. Vander Weide dispute that |
| 13 | | Newfoundland Power has lower regulatory risk than the typical U.S. natural gas |
| 14 | | utility? |
| 15 | | |
| 16 | CA-NP-292 | At Newfoundland Power's last GRA – Moody's Credit Opinion, August 3, 2009 |
| 17 | | (see Application 1 st Revision, Exhibit 4) acknowledge the differences in |
| 18 | | operations in the U.S. and Canada, stating: |
| 19 | | |
| 20 | | "NPI's Baaa 1 issues rating reflects the fact that the company's |
| 21 22 | | operations are exclusively based in Canada, a jurisdiction where regulatory and business environments in general are relatively more |
| 23 | | supportive than those of other international jurisdictions such as the |
| 24 | | United States, in Moody's view." |
| 25 | | In Dr. War day Maidala via a sura Marakala suman a sukan it mada dai a statanan t |
| 26 | | In Dr. Vander Weide's view, was Moody's wrong when it made this statement |
| 27 | | pertaining to the regulatory and business environments in Canada and the U.S.? |
| 28 | CA ND 000 | With reference to the previous question is Dr. Vander Waids aware of any |
| 29 | CA-NP-293 | With reference to the previous question, is Dr. Vander Weide aware of any |
| 30 | | statements from Moody's in which Moody's states that it no longer thinks that |
| 31 | | Canada's regulatory and business environments in general are relatively more |
| 32 | | supportive than those of the United States? |
| 33 | OA ND 004 | In its Credit Oninion of 10, July 2011 on Novefoundland Device Inc. Mandale |
| 34 | CA-NP-294 | In its Credit Opinion of 19 July 2011 on Newfoundland Power Inc., Moody's |
| 35 | | states, |

1 2 "All of NPI's operations are located in Canada whose regulatory and 3 business environments we consider to be supportive relative to those in 4 other jurisdictions. Further, we consider the PUB to be one of the more 5 supportive regulators in Canada. Notwithstanding that NPI's 2011 6 allowed ROE of 8.38% is currently one of the lowest in Canada, its 45% 7 deemed equity is one of the highest in Canada and the PUB's decisions 8 tend to be timely and balanced. We believe that the PUB's review and 9 approval of NPI's capital spending plans and long term debt issuances significantly reduces the risk of cost allowances or the inability to fully 10 recover costs on a timely basis. NPI submits a proposed capital plan for 11 PUB approval annually. Furthermore, NPI is required to obtain PUB 12 13 pre-approval for the issuance of any First Mortgage Bonds (FMB) on the incurrence of credit facilities with maturities exceeding one year." 14 15 16 Does Dr. Vander Weide know why Moody's considers Canada's regulatory and 17 business environments to be supportive relative to those in other jurisdictions, 18 which the Consumer Advocate takes to include the U.S.? Does Dr. Vander 19 Weide agree with Moody's opinion? If not, why not? 20 CA-NP-295 Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: At p. 24 of 106, Dr. Vander Weide states: 21 22 "Some observers have argued that Canada utilities have lower regulatory 23 risk than U.S. utilities because Canadian regulators generally make 24 greater use of cost adjustment and revenue stabilization mechanisms 25 than U.S. regulators." 26 27 Who are the "observers" referred to by Dr. Vander Weide? Would Moody's be 28 considered such an "observer" by Dr. Vander Weide? 29 30 CA-NP-296 Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Please confirm that Dr. Vander Weide's 31 basis for disputing that Canadian utilities have lower regulatory risk than U.S. 32 utilities is his assertion at p. 24 of his pre-filed evidence that "U.S. utilities have 33 many cost adjustment and revenue stabilization mechanisms similar to those of 34 Canadian utilities." 35 36 37 CA-NP-297 Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: In Dr. Vander Weide's opinion, what role should customer hardship have as a factor influencing allowed equity returns of public 38

| 1 | | utilities? |
|----------|-----------|--|
| 2 | | |
| 3 | CA-NP-298 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: At p. 27 of 106, Dr. Vander Weide states that |
| 4 | | the group of 24 electric utilities in the Moody's group have a Value Line Safety |
| 5 | | Rank of 1, 2, or 3. Please provide a copy of the Value Line Safety Rank |
| 6 | | Methodology. |
| 7 | CA-NP-299 | Fridames of Dr. Vondor Weider, Furthern to the previous supetion, places previous |
| 8 | CA-NP-299 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Further to the previous question, please provide |
| 9 | | the specific Value Line Safety Rank of each of the firms in his U.S. company |
| 10 11 | | sample. |
| 12 | CA-NP-300 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: At p. 36, Dr. Vander Weide refers to the |
| 13 | | "primary advantages" of using U.S. utility groups to estimate the cost of equity for |
| 14 | | Newfoundland Power. What are the disadvantages of using U.S. utility groups |
| 15 | | to estimate the cost of equity for Newfoundland Power? |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | CA-NP-301 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: At p. 38, Dr. Vander Weide refers to the NEB's |
| 18 | | decision in RH-1-2008. The quotation taken from the decision refers to risk |
| 19 | | differences between Canada and the U.S. and that they can be understood and |
| 20 | | accounted for. What are the risk differences between Canada and the U.S. and |
| 21 | | how has Dr. Vander Weide addressed and accounted for these in his evidence |
| 22 | | on behalf of his client, Newfoundland Power? |
| 23 | | |
| 24 | CA-NP-302 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Do U.S. regulatory boards find that cost of |
| 25 | | equity evidence for Canadian utilities is useful in determining the cost of equity |
| 26 | | for the utilities they regulate? Please provide extracts from U.S. regulatory |
| 27 | | decisions where reliance was placed upon cost of equity evidence for Canadian |
| 28 | | utilities. |
| 29 | | |
| 30 | CA-NP-303 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: At p. 42, Dr. Vander Weide states that he has |
| 31 | | applied the DCF model to the Value Line electric and natural gas utilities shown |
| 32 | | in Exhibit 14 and Exhibit 15. Dr. Vander Weide also states that the companies |
| 33 | | in his sample have a Value Line Safety Rank of 1, 2 or 3. Please identify the |
| 34 | | companies in each of Exhibits 14 and Exhibits 15 in accordance with their Value |

| 1 | | Line Safety Rank. |
|----|-----------|--|
| 2 | | |
| 3 | CA-NP-304 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Please provide the Value Line ranking |
| 4 | | methodology and criteria as well as copies of the Value Line ranking documents |
| 5 | | wherein these companies are ranked. |
| 6 | | |
| 7 | CA-NP-305 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: How would Dr. Vander Weide rank |
| 8 | | Newfoundland Power using the Value Line methodology and criteria? |
| 9 | | |
| 10 | CA-NP-306 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Dr. Vander Weide states at p. 43 that the |
| 11 | | application of the DCF model to his comparable group of electric utilities |
| 12 | | produces a result of 10.1 percent without an allowance for financial flexibility. |
| 13 | | Please indicate what the result would be if only Value Line Safety Rank 1 to |
| 14 | | companies were used, and please provide a copy of Exhibit 14 as re-stated using |
| 15 | | this assumption. |
| 16 | | |
| 17 | CA-NP-307 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Dr. Vander Weide states at p. 43 that the |
| 18 | | application of the DCF model to his compared group of natural gas utilities |
| 19 | | produces a result of 9.4 percent without an allowance for financial flexibility. |
| 20 | | Please indicate what the result would be if only Value Line Safety Rank 1 |
| 21 | | companies were used and please provide a copy of Exhibit 15 as re-stated using |
| 22 | | this assumption. |
| 23 | | |
| 24 | CA-NP-308 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: At p. 43, Dr. Vander Weide states that the |
| 25 | | average DCF result including a fifty basis point allowance for financial flexibility |
| 26 | | from his two comparable groups is 10.3 percent. What would the average DCF |
| 27 | | result be using only Value Line Safety Rank 1 companies? |
| 28 | | |
| 29 | CA-NP-309 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: At. P. 43 (line 28-31) Dr. Vander Weide states |
| 30 | | that he has conservatively concluded that his comparable companies' cost of |
| 31 | | equity is 10.4 percent as shown in Table 5 at p. 44. Please re-state Table 5 |
| 32 | | assuming the use of Value Line Safety Rank 1 companies. |
| 33 | | |
| 34 | CA-NP-310 | Evidence of Dr. Vander Weide: Fully explain on what basis Dr. Vander Weide |

| 1 | believes it is appropriately to compare Newfoundland Power to companies with |
|----------|---|
| 2 | an inferior Value Line Safety Risk? |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | Dated at St. John's in the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, this 16 th day of April, 2012. |
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| 8 | |
| 9 | |
| 10 | |
| 11 | |
| 12 | Thomas Johnson |
| 13 | Consumer Advocate |
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